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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial sector in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) economies is generally still in the 
early stages of development. Capital markets in 
these countries are neither efficient nor well-
developed and in many cases are almost non-
existent, whilst their financial sector is still 
dominated by the banking industry (Turk-Ariss, 
2009; Abuzayed et al., 2012). The banking sector in 
MENA plays a leading role in these economies by 
providing funds to private and public investment 
projects as well as financing government deficits. 
The banks in the MENA region are also engaged in 
major economic reforms, as required by the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), to which these countries 
either belong or plan to join. 
These reforms are crucial parameters for the 
performance of national financial systems and 
national economies in general (Gattoufi et al., 2009). 
During the last three decades, the banking industry 
in MENA economies has witnessed major 
developments in its activities, including 
liberalisation of financial markets in terms of 
elimination of either capital or ownership barriers, 
transferring the control of ownership of large shares 
of the banking sector from government to private, 
and from domestic to foreign (Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Farazi et al., 2011; Hassan et al., 2012). The 
increasing role of foreign investors is partly due to 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the market 
concentration, foreign ownership and profitability for commercial 
banks operating in the MENA economies over the period 1999-
2012. This paper uses panel analysis via GMM estimation to 
examine a large sample of banks for a period that includes the 
recent global crisis and Arab uprising, marked by political changes 
and by liberalisation and market transformation. Findings indicate 
that the SCP hypothesis is not rejected, highlighting that increased 
market power yields monopoly profits. The fact that the impact of 
market concentration is positive in MENA economies is vital 
evidence, at least to a certain extent that bank performance is 
explained by market concentration. Findings also confirm that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between 
profitability and capital adequacy, confirming that regulators and 
policy makers should ensure banks are well capitalised to 
guarantee survival and stability for MENA banks. Cost efficiency 
and bank size have decreased the profitability of banks, and banks 
with foreign ownership are more profitable and perform better 
than state banks. Overall, the paper finds evidence of structural 
reforms and uncovers measures that have led to the improvement 
of regulation, and the implementation of frameworks which 
should continue to improve competitiveness within MENA banking 
sectors. In addition, future policy on the banking sector should 
take account of intervention to change the market structure and to 
stimulate competition.   
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privatised banks which were sold to them, and 
partly to the entry of new foreign banks1. The 
increase in foreign ownership has led to 
improvements in the banking efficiency of host 
countries, and the privatisation of state banks is 
believed to broaden access to financial services and 
to increase competition (Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; 
Lee-Jong, 2002). Liberalisation of the banking sector 
aims to attract new investments and encourage the 
restructuring of inefficient parts of the banking 
sector and to improve the financial performance. On 
the other hand, giving licenses to foreign banks 
strengthened fears of creating further risks for 
domestic banks as they would have to significantly 
increase their investments to become competitive 
with foreign banks (Unite & Sullivan, 2003; Lee-Jong, 
2002). 
The significance of a well-functioning banking 
sector for the growth and welfare of a country is 
increasingly important for assessing the impact of 
market structure and determinants of profitability 
for MENA banks, including bank-specific variables 
and macroeconomic variables, in the context of the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis (SCP). 
Investigating whether the profitability of MENA 
banks is due to the market concentration is of great 
importance for banking regulators; if bank 
profitability is a function of the industry’s structure, 
then regulatory policy should intervene to change 
market structure to enhance competition so as to 
safeguard the soundness of the banking sector and 
the whole economy. Profitability is the key measure 
of a bank’s success and its ability to survive in the 
industry and to expand its activities, therefore 
maximising its shareholders’ returns and 
safeguarding the stability of the whole economy. The 
first objective of this paper consists of examining 
whether commercial bank profitability, measured in 
terms of ROA, ROE and NIM is solely a function of 
market structure (SCP) as measured by the 
Herfindahl index (HHI). The second aim is to 
examine whether bank-level variables lead to better 
bank performance, by examining the effect of these 
factors on bank profitability in eleven MENA 
countries during an extended period that, for the 
first time, includes the global crisis period. If these 
factors are significant, then a policy mix that 
maximises these factors could strengthen the 
stability of the financial sector and the growth of 
these countries. If bank size (total assets), for 
example, significantly affects profitability, then 
mergers, that naturally result in larger institutions, 
should be encouraged. If higher Equity to average 
total assets (EQAS), leads to the enhanced financial 
performance of banks, then regulators should 
encourage stricter capital adequacy requirements for 
MENA banks to safeguard the stability of the 
financial system.  
The importance of this study is fourfold. First, 
examining whether market structure drives the 
profitability of MENA banks is crucial both in terms 
of policy implications to reshape the banking system 
of these countries and efficiently allocate investment 
funds from banks, and to develop these economies 
in the long run. Second, this is the first study to 
cover a large sample of 11 MENA countries for an 
                                                          
1 In particular, Citigroup, HSPC, BMP Paribas and ABN have generally 
opened up their business in the MENA region through subsidiaries and started 
competing with domestic banks in different segments of the banking industry 
(Turk-Ariss, 2009; Farazi et al., 2011; Hassan et al., 2012). 
extended and recent period (14 years) in the context 
of SCP, filling a significant gap in research for MENA 
economies. Third, findings of this paper will help to 
draw, for the first time, reliable conclusions about 
how ownership, macroeconomic and firm-specific 
factors relate to bank performance in the MENA 
region after the liberalisation and related 
transformation of their economies, which aimed to 
improve bank performance and promote 
competition. Finally, it shows if foreign participants, 
capital adequacy, bank size, and cost management 
have any significant policy implications for the 
banking regulators, international organisations, and 
other stakeholders.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section two 
is a description of the sample used in the study and 
of the major developments in the MENA banking 
sector. Section three reviews banking literature and 
generates hypotheses that are examined in this 
study. Section four presents the methodology and 
model used, while section five introduces the 
empirical results. The conclusion and policy 
implication are undertaken in section six.  
 
2.  MENA BANKING SECTOR  
 
Although MENA countries exhibit a number of 
similarities as a result of social and geographical 
proximities, these countries present several 
differences in terms of economic and institutional 
environments, including the banking industry. 
Countries in this region vary in size, GDP per capita 
and financial development. The sample considers 
149 commercial banks from 11 countries, namely 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia. Table 1 presents bank 
statistics by country, providing the first indication of 
similarities and differences, in terms of a number of 
banks and ownership type examined by country.  
 
Table 1. Number of banks in the sample 
 
Country 
Number of 
total banks 
Domestic 
banks 
Foreign 
banks 
Bahrain 10 7 3 
Kuwait 5 5 0 
Oman 6 2 4 
Qatar 7 6 1 
Saudi Arabia 8 8 0 
United Arab Emirates 18 15 3 
Egypt 23 11 12 
Jordan 11 9 2 
Lebanon 35 30 5 
Morocco 13 9 4 
Tunisia 13 7 6 
Total 149 109 40 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
sample in MENA economies during the study period 
(1999-2012). It is evident that the capitalisation of 
commercial banks differs considerably according to 
the income level of a country. Whilst average ratio of 
equity to assets (EQAS) is 11.42, banks that operate 
in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and 
Qatar are better capitalised than other banks in 
other MENA countries. Differences can be justified 
by regulatory differences and economic 
developments in these countries. Regarding cost 
management, it is observed that banks in low-
income MENA economies on average are neither cost 
efficient (as measured by COST/INCOME ratio) nor 
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developed compared to other MENA economies. 
These observations can be explained by regulation 
and, administrative costs, corporate governance and 
bank employment policies. Banks in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan reveal the higher cost 
to income than the MENA average, reflecting that the 
banking sectors in those markets are not as well 
developed or efficient in managing costs of 
operating banks and that regulations need to be 
reviewed.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics, mean and standard deviation (in brackets) 
 
Country Cost EQAS Size Loanast Loaresg SECAST GDPGR INF Lofund Exptec ROA ROE 
Bahrain  
46.28 
(14.24) 
11.04 
(2.76) 
1.17 
(1.01) 
44.31 
(12.78) 
5.74 
(4.77) 
0.250 
(0.13) 
5.43 
(1.75) 
95.98 
( 25.69) 
56.56 
(16.42) 
2.08 
(1.62) 
1.04 
(1.15) 
9.39 
(11.11) 
Oman  
44.80 
(6.77) 
12.97 
(2.24) 
390 
(416) 
69.44 
(7.97) 
6.08 
(4.08) 
0.101 
(0.061) 
4.51 
(3.14) 
118.72 
(17.22) 
87.27 
(9.54) 
2.71 
(1.58) 
1.89 
(1.28) 
14.05 
(10.11) 
Qatar  
32.58 
(8.76) 
13.90 
(3.63) 
1.12 
(1.81) 
57.26 
(6.99) 
5.41 
(7.86) 
0.206 
(0.163) 
12.05 
(6.43) 
187.83 
(42.4) 
(71.66) 
10.707 
1.64 
(1.30) 
2.46 
(1.13) 
17.89 
(9.62) 
Saudi 
Arabia  
38.24 
(10.82) 
12.18 
(3.11) 
2.29 
(1.74) 
50.78 
(9.62) 
5.03 
(4.93) 
0.308 
(0.094) 
4.87 
(3.05) 
101.30 
(10.67) 
61.05 
(12.72) 
1.593 
(0.594) 
2.23 
(1.58) 
18.63 
(13.84) 
UAE 
32.21 
(10.11) 
17.11 
(5.630) 
1.25 
(1.89) 
61.74 
(11.14) 
6.73 
(5.97) 
0.076 
(0.058) 
4.64 
(4.15) 
193.10 
(41.78) 
82.70 
(17.13) 
1.54 
(0.925) 
2.48 
(1.55) 
14.84 
(7.26) 
Kuwait  
29.36 
(8.09) 
12.19 
(2.70) 
1.42 
(1.20) 
54.68 
(10.93) 
6.04 
(3.32) 
0.233 
(0.108) 
4.32 
(5.94) 
124.88 
(18.13) 
65.60 
(12.55) 
1.26 
(0.418) 
1.86 
(1.52) 
13.90 
(20.99) 
Egypt  
54.50 
(32.11) 
9.60 
(4.79) 
576 
(932) 
39.87 
(11.96) 
13.52 
(8.53) 
0.252 
(0.120) 
4.64 
(1.71) 
151.65 
(52.77) 
47.02 
(14.38) 
2.505 
(1.98) 
0.89 
(1.72) 
10.75 
(25.64) 
Jordan  
51.77 
(15.41) 
11.77 
(6.42) 
858 
(1.28) 
44.01 
(7.41) 
7.44 
(6.62) 
0.176 
(0.072) 
5.46 
(2.22) 
104.11 
(18.34) 
56.70 
(13.50) 
1.54 
(0.722) 
1.23 
(1.06) 
11.79 
(16.51) 
Lebanon  
63.76 
(27.81) 
8.94 
(4.52) 
340 
(489) 
26.40 
(8.69) 
11.26 
(10.58) 
0.351 
(0.120) 
3.96 
(3.33) 
97.43 
(13.76) 
(30.71) 
(11.02) 
1.166 
(1.501) 
0.76 
(0.846) 
12.58 
(35.12) 
Morocco  
57.04 
(24.59) 
7.85 
(2.99) 
1.20 
(1.03) 
45.90 
(20.10) 
3.32 
(3.12) 
1.12 
(7.63) 
4.32 
(2.02) 
100.06 
(7.10) 
(46.00) 
(18.69) 
1.685 
(1.59) 
0.79 
(1.18) 
9.43 
(36.07) 
Tunisia  
63.26 
(25.64) 
11.54 
(13.99) 
185 
(165) 
62.67 
(23.31) 
18.08 
(15.12) 
0.074 
(0.110) 
3.93 
(2.23) 
109.04 
(13.34) 
83.33 
(64.01) 
1.78 
(1.20) 
0.30 
(4.51) 
6.31 
(34.68) 
 
Furthermore, in terms of market structure and 
competition, Table 3 presents market concentration 
levels and trends, proxied by HHI value, during the 
period of 1999 to 2012. It reveals that some MENA 
economies can be described as being less 
concentrated, while others have a high degree of 
bank market concentration. Banks operate under a 
medium degree of concentration in two Gulf 
countries, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, whilst the 
banking sectors of other Gulf countries, namely 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait are very 
concentrated, explained by the small size of those 
economies.  
Higher degrees of concentration can be 
justified by the political systems in those countries 
which are dominated by royal families. Moreover, 
the GCC are considered to be oil-rich producers and 
having relatively recently established banking 
sectors. Finally, the banking industry in other 
countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, is shown to be 
moderately concentrated, and the banking market in 
Lebanon could be described as a competitive market. 
The substantial market structure in the MENA 
banking market raises the essential concern that 
banks which operate in concentrated markets are 
more profitable and gain market power. Therefore, 
they will be able to charge higher than competitive 
prices for their banking products, which in turn 
affect their welfare costs. 
 
Table 3. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) market structure of commercial banks in the MENA economies 
 
Year Bahrain UAE 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Qatar Oman Kuwait Jordan Lebanon Egypt Tunisia Morocco 
1999 3646 1813 1594 4594 2611 3286 3834 891 1949 2966 2257 
2000 3740 1828 1579 4678 2661 3311 3800 883 2005 2831 2239 
2001 3633 1705 1545 4707 2574 3310 3753 1056 2076 2624 2246 
2002 3593 1657 1510 4633 2680 3353 3782 968 2079 4904 2286 
2003 3433 1631 1499 4314 2590 3176 3834 1001 2024 1451 2281 
2004 2682 1634 1454 3854 2767 3263 3744 1124 1936 1272 2304 
2005 2488 1626 1422 3403 2687 3274 3321 1157 2029 1228 1956 
2006 2554 1439 1401 3401 3005 2622 3320 1137 1787 1069 1985 
2007 2401 1725 1445 3510 2923 2376 3350 1094 1562 1072 1290 
2008 2222 1665 1384 3512 3094 2332 3445 1085 1643 1058 1304 
2009 2337 1634 1457 3279 2919 2490 3273 1070 1564 1038 1319 
2010 2391 1594 1491 3528 2738 2472 3034 973 1643 1021 1310 
2011 2318 1629 1485 3777 2927 2474 2973 928 1687 1052 1514 
2012 2259 1677 1472 3909 2562 2686 2955 922 1672 1100 1799 
Source: Calculated by the researcher from data obtained by Bank scope. 
 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
 
This paper is interested in examining market 
concentration and the determinants of MENA banks’ 
profitability in the context of Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) to obtain evidence whether 
market structure in MENA plays a role in explaining 
the financial performance of the banking industry. 
SCP hypothesis assumes that industry structure 
affects industry performance (Bain, 1951), 
advocating that an increase or decrease in industry 
concentration may have an impact on a firm’s 
profitability (Goldberg & Rai, 1996). In the banking 
industry, this results in non-competitive pricing 
behaviour of banks with a significant market share 
(Berger & Hannan, 1989). In developing countries, 
both hypotheses were investigated, inter alia, in 
Taiwan (Tu & Chen, 2000) and Bangladesh (Samad, 
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2008), as cited by Al-Muharrami and Al-Matthews 
(2009). The market concentration was first employed 
to measure the impact of concentration on 
performance among banks in the domestic United 
States market. In this regard, Lloyd-Williams et al. 
(1994) investigated the applicability of two 
competing hypotheses, SCP and EH, to assess the 
structure of the banking industry in Spain using the 
concentration ratio and market share for each bank 
to characterise its efficiency over the period 1986-
1988. Findings implied that market concentration is 
found to have a positive impact on the performance 
of Spanish banks measured by return on assets 
(ROA), which in turn supports the traditional SCP 
hypothesis. In the same context, the relationship 
between market structure and performance of 
European banks has been investigated by Goldberg 
and Rai (1996). As the European banking market is 
controlled by large banks with branches spread 
across individual countries, their study concentrates 
solely on large banks in each country, so that it is 
doubtful that branches are able to significantly 
impact prices. Nonetheless, slight support was 
detected for the SCP hypothesis; hence a simple 
policy of strict boundaries on cross-border 
acquisitions and growth is not reasonable.  
In respect to MENA economies, Ben Naceur 
(2003) examined the impact of a bank’s 
characteristics, financial structure and 
macroeconomic indicators on its net interest 
margins and profitability in Tunisian commercial 
banks for the period 1980-2000. This study found 
that the market concentration has a negative and 
significant impact on net interest margins but is 
insignificant with returns on average assets. Such 
results indicate that market concentration is less 
beneficial in terms of profitability for the Tunisian 
commercial banks and competition. Another study, 
which included all the Arab Gulf countries (Al-
Muharrami and Matthews, 2009), evaluated the 
performance of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) banking sector in the context of the structure 
conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis over the 
period 1993-2002. In respect to methodology and 
data of this study, Al-Muharrami and Matthews 
(2009) employed the methodology of Berger and 
Hannan (1997) in testing the relationship between 
market structure and bank performance as the basic 
model. Data of the study covers 52 banks operating 
in five GCC countries during the period 1993 - 2002, 
as well as the UEA during the period 1995-2002. The 
empirical findings of the study showed that the 
banking business in the Arab GCC is influenced by 
the mainstream SCP hypothesis. In the State of 
Qatar, Elsiefy (2013) investigated determinates of 
conventional and Islamic banks’ profitability over 
the period 2006-2011. Results support SCP 
hypothesis as the relation between the profitability 
of conventional banks and market concentration is 
found. Further, Lin et al (2014) examined 14 Asia 
Pacific economies from 2003 to 2010 to investigate 
the influence of bank competition, concentration, 
regulation and national institutions on individual 
bank fragility, providing evidence that greater 
concentration fosters financial fragility and that 
lower pricing power also induces bank risk exposure 
after controlling for a variety of macroeconomic, 
bank-specific, regulatory and institutional factors. 
According to the above arguments, the relation 
between a bank’s profitability and market 
concentration could be positive; hence, the first 
hypothesis to examine SCP can be formulated as 
follows: 
H
1
: Bank superior profitability in MENA region is 
due to high market concentration (SCP hypothesis). 
However, there is some evidence showing that 
bank profitability is affected by bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables, for instance in EU (see 
Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007), and in Greece 
(Kosmidou, 2008; Alexiou & Sofoklis, 2009). 
Regarding bank-specific variables, the relationship 
between capital adequacy and profitability is 
explained by signalling theory, which argues that 
higher capital reveals a positive signal from the 
management about future firm prospects that affect 
the market value of a bank (Berger, 1995; Trujillo-
Ponce, 2013). In contrast, bankruptcy hypothesis 
suggests that banks should hold more capital in 
order to be further away from financial distress 
especially in a case where bankruptcy costs are high 
(Berger, 1995). Whilst, the risk-return theory argues 
that increasing leverage leads to increased risks and 
then higher than expected returns indicating a 
negative relationship between capital and bank 
performance (Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; 
Obammyi, 2014). A number of previous studies 
(Demirgue-kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras & 
Kosmidou, 2007; Kosmidou, 2008; Sufian, 2012; 
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; Sufian, 2009; Trujillo-Ponce, 
2013) document that a positive relationship between 
capital and profitability is supported by signalling 
hypothesis. More recent studies by Albulescu (2015); 
Djalilov and Piesse (2016); Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2017) 
confirmed that well-capitalised banks are 
performing better in emerging countries and early 
transition countries respectively as the overall sector 
is more robust and they benefit from sound 
financial management. These arguments suggest a 
positive relationship between capital adequacy and 
profitability of MENA banks as follows: 
H
2
: The capital adequacy leads to increase in 
bank’s profitability. 
To examine the argument that efficient cost 
management is seen as a key mechanism to enhance 
the profitability of banks. In this respect, cost to 
income ratio is considered to measure the 
operational efficiency for commercial banks in the 
MENA countries. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999); Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007); Kosmidou 
(2008); Obamuyi (2014); and Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2014) documented that poor cost 
management is one of the key variables that 
decreases the profitability of banks in various 
economies. Bejaoui and Bouzarrou (2014) 
highlighted the importance of operating and 
administrative costs, especially staff expenses, as 
overstaffing costs can negatively affect the 
profitability of banks. Such matters, in particular, 
MENA countries could be due to cultural and social 
relationships as state banks still have a large share 
in the economy and frequently employ more people 
in order to reduce unemployment rates and ensure 
political stability. Therefore, this paper expects that 
there is a negative association between cost 
management and a bank’s profitability: 
H
3
: There is a negative relationship between the 
cost management and MENA bank’s profitability. 
In respect to bank size which is measured by 
total assets, Djalilov and Piesse (2016) argued that 
size is a key element to explain performance if there 
are economies or diseconomies of scale. In a number 
of recent studies, this variable is found to be 
negatively related to the financial performance of 
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banks specifying that larger banks are likely to 
generate lower profits when compared to small 
banks. Obamuyi (2014) and Tan and Floros (2012) 
suggested that the negative relationship between 
bank profitability and its size might be associated 
with more bureaucratic procedures which in turn 
negatively affect bank performance and profitability. 
Additionally, Obamuyi (2014) looked at Nigeria as 
one of the developing economies and stressed that 
forced mergers and acquisitions in 2006, which 
resulted in a drop from 89 banks to 24 groups of 
banks, caused a decline of returns in banks. In such 
matters, merger decisions should receive more 
attention and be carefully considered by 
policymakers and banking regulators to avoid 
having negative outputs and therefore negatively 
affecting the financial stability. Trujillo-Ponce (2013) 
and Obamuyi (2014) suggested that larger and 
diversified banks are more likely to exhibit poor 
performance, while smaller banks can be more 
efficient by reducing asymmetric information issues 
associated with lending activities. This assertion 
supports the argument that smaller banks display 
economies of scale. Also, Chen and Liao (2011) 
emphasised that the negative coefficient of bank 
size indicated that larger banks tend to make lower 
profits, exhibiting diseconomies of scale, whereas 
smaller banks are likely to gain more profits. Studies 
in other markets governed by Europe and America 
verify the existence of economies of scale. 
Differences can be explained by variations between 
two banking markets in terms of regulations of 
banks, qualifications of employees, levels of 
expertise, economic indicators and concentration 
level. Based on examined markets, this paper argues 
that the larger the bank, the larger the number of 
employees and the more bureaucratic the 
procedures, leading to negative effects on the bank’s 
performance. The preceding arguments will 
formulate the fifth hypothesis:  
 H
4
: There is a negative relationship between 
bank size and bank profitability. 
In addition to the above discussion, the relation 
between risk and profitability of banks measured by 
the loan ratio has been investigated by a number of 
scholars (Chen & Liao, 2011; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 
2007; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009; Sufian, 2012; 
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). They reveal a positive and 
significant relationship to the profitability, 
indicating that more loans can positively affect the 
profitability of commercial banks. They clearly show 
an increase in loans ratio resulting in improving the 
profitability of banks. Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009) 
argue that an increase in liquidity (fewer loans) will 
cause a decline in profitability. Such arguments 
highlight the trade-off between liquidity and 
profitability. In this regard, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) 
document that the larger the bank’s loan portfolio is 
on its balance sheet, the higher is its profitability. 
However, this thesis tests whether there is a direct 
relationship between bank risk and profitability as 
follows:  
H
5
: There is a positive relationship between the 
loan ratio and bank profitability.  
Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio 
(𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺) is a measure for credit quality and credit 
allocation (Djalilov & Piesse, 2016; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2014; Ahmad et al., 2012; Bejaoui & 
Bouzgarrou, 2014; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; Alper & 
Anbar, 2011). Regarding Spanish banking 
profitability, Trujillo-Ponce (2013) documented this 
variable to be a very important determinant as 
profitability decreased significantly and such 
relationships could exist because an increase in the 
doubtful loans, which do not accrue income, 
requires a bank to allocate a major percentage of its 
gross margin to provision to cover expected credit 
losses; therefore, profitability will drop. Further, 
Alper and Anbar (2011) stated that credit portfolio 
volume and weak asset quality affect negatively 
profitability of banks. The control of credit quality 
remains a debatable matter, especially in the case of 
emerging economies. Confirming with Ahmad et al. 
(2012), this study argues that banks in MENA may be 
negatively influenced by increasing loss on loans 
leading to lower profitability of banks.  
H
6
: There is a negative relationship between the 
asset quality and bank profitability.  
The impact of foreign ownership is still 
debatable as enhancing the health of the financial 
system of the host country is susceptible to weaker 
domestic banks. Advantages of foreign ownership 
on the host nation can be defined as improvements 
in financial banking services, encouraging 
competition, upgrading privatisation, spreading 
expertise and introducing new financial instruments. 
In this matter, Demirgiuc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
as well as Claessens et al. (2001), Farazi el al. (2011), 
and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) find that banks 
with foreign ownership have higher margins and 
profits than domestic banks in developing countries. 
Moreover, foreign banks are more likely to have 
positive effects on lending practices in emerging 
economies. Large state-owned enterprises are 
heavily involved in many private-sector economic 
activities and the public sector still has a significant 
share of the sector, therefore raising the need to 
examine whether this role adversely affects the 
performance of the banking sector. Moreover, 
despite recent liberalisation, trade regimes in MENA 
remain more restrictive than those of its peers2, 
raising both the need to examine how to maintain 
competition and the contribution of foreign 
participants in improving banking performance in 
the sector. Regulators have traditionally employed 
market structure as a policy variable to recommend 
measures aimed at increasing competition, 
stimulating financial liberalisation and eliminating 
entry barriers for foreign banks (Turk-Ariss, 2009; 
Bikker et al., 2012). Finally, investigating if MENA 
bank performance is influenced by foreign 
ownership, a hypothesis expressed as follows: 
H
7
: Foreign ownership leads to increase bank 
profitability in MENA. 
 
4.  DATA AND MODEL 
 
4.1.  Data 
 
Table 4 lists variables used in this paper. Following 
previous studies, by Smirlock (1985) and Berger and 
Hannan (1993) this paper measures bank financial 
performance by using log of return on average 
assets (LROA), log of return on average equity (LROE) 
and log of net interest margin (LNIM). The set of 
variables that control bank-specific characteristics 
include: the logarithm of cost-to-income (LCOST); 
equity to total assets (LEQAS), which measures 
capital adequacy and capital strength; spending on 
                                                          
2 MENA countries lowered tariffs during the past 20 years, in the context of 
trade agreements with the EU and the US but still tariffs remain high, 
averaging 12%, and many MENA countries have more than average trade 
restrictiveness. 
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fixed assets; and (LEXPTEC), the ratio of a bank’s 
loans to customers and short-term funding, loans to 
assets and Asset size. The cost to income ratio 
measures efficiency in expenditures management 
(Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Kosmidou, 2008) and 
is expected to have a negative effect on bank 
performance because efficient banks run their 
activities at lower cost.  
 
Table 4. Definitions of variables used in assessing performance and market structure 
 
Variable Description 
L Logarithm 
ROA Return on average assets is the net after tax divided by average total assets. 
ROE Return on average equity is a measure of the return on shareholder funds. 
NIM/TA Net interest margin to average total assets. 
EQAS 
Equity to total assets. This variable measures capital adequacy computed as equity to total assets. High capital-
asset ratios indicate low leverage and therefore lower risks. 
COST 
The cost to income ratio. It provides information on the efficiency of the management concerning expenses relative 
to the revenues it generates. Higher ratios indicate a less efficient management.  
LOFUND 
This is a measure of liquidity computed as loans to deposits and short-term funding. Higher ratios imply lower 
liquidity.  
SIZE 
Total assets represent a proxy for bank size including earning assets + cash and due from banks + foreclosed real 
estate + fixed assets + goodwill. 
SECAST 
Total securities to total assets include loans and advances + trading securities + derivatives + available for the sale 
securities + held to maturity securities + equity investments + government bonds + other securities. 
EXPTEC 
Spending on fixed assets and technological items. Calculated by capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed 
assets. Capital expenses refer to costs spending on fixed assets. Fixed assets include tangible assets fixed assets 
(land, buildings and installations, furniture office, computers, ATMs, technological items) and intangible fixed 
assets such as (goodwill, software, research and development expenses, etc.). 
CR 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a measure of market concentration within the industry and is used as 
an indicator of the amount of competition among banks. 
MS 
A measure calculated by dividing the assets of the first largest bank with the assets of all banks operating in a 
country.  
LOARESG Loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio, measuring credit quality and credit allocation. 
GDPGR The real gross domestic product (GDP) growth. 
INF The real inflation rate. 
FORE Dummy variable for foreign ownership. 
STATE Dummy variable for state ownership. 
Coun Dummy variable for country effects. 
Year Dummy variable for year effects. 
Source: Bankscope database, Bloomberg database and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
To examine economies of scale the log of 
average total assets (LSIZE) is used, as in Smirlock 
(1985), Lloyd-Williams (1994) and Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2014). Liquidity management proxy is a 
bank’s loans divided by deposits and short-term 
funding (LOFUND) as in Pasiouras and Kosmidou 
(2007), Samad (2008) and Obamuyi (2014). 
According to Olsen and Zoubi (2011), securities to 
total assets ratio (SECAST) includes other loans and 
asset-based sources of income that are expected to 
have positive or negative signs depending on 
whether the bank invests beyond optimum levels. 
Spending on fixed assets (EXPTEC) is our proxy and 
novelty. Loan-loss provisions to gross loans 
(LOAREASG) measures exposure to credit risk and it 
is expected to have a negative association with 
profitability. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
that is used in the current study as a proxy of 
market structure is employed by policymakers and 
regulators in the banking sector and is computed as 
follows:  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑(𝑀𝑆𝑖)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (1) 
 
Where MS is a bank’s market share in the 
industry and n denotes the number of firms in the 
sector. The larger the Herfindahl index the larger the 
market power.  
To account for macroeconomic variables, 
because they may influence bank operations as 
suggested by some banking studies (Samad, 2008; 
Kosmidou, 2008; Sufian, 2012), inflation (INF) and 
Gross domestic product growth (GDPGR) are used in 
this study. To investigate whether ownership 
influences bank profitability, this study defines a 
bank as foreign-owned if the absolute majority of 
shares belongs to the foreign investors are more 
than 50%. The output of the bank is captured by 
ROA, ROE, and NIM, while CR denotes the 
concentration index estimated by HHI.  
 
4.2.  Model specification 
 
Given the dynamic nature of this study, least 
squares estimation methods are likely to create 
biased and inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2001). 
Furthermore, microeconomics analyses comparative 
statistics which, though accurate on equilibrium 
outcomes is rather weak on the dynamic process 
(Blaug, 1980). The static theory is regarded as being 
more abstract than dynamic theory because it does 
not take into account inter alia lags and sequences 
(Schumpeter, 1954).  
In addition, a number of explanatory variables 
are suspected to be endogenous. The more 
profitable the banks, the more able they are to 
increase their capital by retaining profits (Garcia-
Herrero et al., 2009; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011). 
However, causality could also be bidirectional, since 
a more profitable bank may employ more people 
and therefore decrease its operational efficiency 
pointed. Also, unobserved heterogeneity across 
banks may exist in the MENA region, along with 
differences in corporate governance which cannot be 
easily measured, raising the need to address these 
concerns. This study, therefore, uses Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation following 
Arellano and Bond (1991). GMM uses lagged values 
of the dependent variable in levels and in 
differences, as well as lagged values of other 
independent variables that are suspected to suffer 
from endogeneity, along with controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity and persistence of the 
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dependent variable. However, to deal with omitted 
variables the study employs the Wald test to 
examine the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the regressors are not individually equal to zero. If 
the null hypothesis is not rejected, the equation 
should be re-estimated with only the control 
variables which were significant in the general 
regression. Otherwise, a less restrictive hypothesis is 
tested, while still attempting to decrease the number 
of non-significant variables to the maximum extent 
possible. Such estimations yield consistent 
estimations of the parameters, and the coefficients 
obtained by this way are considered to be more 
reliable as the number of variables is reduced to the 
minimum (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009). 
To empirically examine the impacts of financial 
performance determinants, we follow Athanasoglou 
et al. (2008) and Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009) and 
employ a dynamic linear model given by (2) 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝛿𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝐷𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the profitability measure for MENA 
banks and 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the one-period lagged profitability 
measured by 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 or one-period lagged 
for performance measured by 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1. 𝑋𝑖 are bank-
specific variables, while 𝑌𝑖 represents 
macroeconomic variables and 𝐷𝑖 is used to capture 
country effects, year effects and the ownership 
dummy variable. A value of 𝛿 denotes the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium. A value of 𝛿 between 0 
and 1 implies that profitability is persistent, and it 
will eventually return to the equilibrium level. Values 
close to 0 indicate a high speed of adjustment and 
imply a relatively competitive market structure, 
whereas a value close to 1 implies a less competitive 
market.  
In order to examine bank profitability 
determinants in the context of SCP hypothesis, the 
following equations (3, 4 and 5) are run: 
 
𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + +𝛼2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌8𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌9𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  
(3) 
 
Next, return on average equity is used as a 
dependent variable representing profits of banks, as 
well as steps of eliminating variables, repeated 
respectively:  
 
𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + +𝛼1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌8𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌9𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  
(4) 
As net interest margins are considered a 
measure of operating income of banks, this variable 
has been investigated, as it relies on factors tested 
above to see whether these factors impact this 
variable or not:  
 
𝐿𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + +𝛼1𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌8𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌9𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  
(5) 
LROA, LROE and LNIM are used as dependent 
variables to represent profitability measures: LROA 
is the log of return on total assets; LROE is the log of 
return on total equity, and LNIM is the log of net 
interest margin. With regards to independent 
variables, where 𝑖𝑡 is the subscript indicating bank 𝑖 
at time 𝑡, CR indicates market concentration of 
banking sector and LCOST is the log of cost to 
income ratio; LEQAS denotes the log of Equity to 
total assets; LSECAST refers to total securities to 
total assets; LSIZE is the log of total assets; and 
LLOFUND denotes loans to deposits and short term 
funding. LEXPTEC refers to spending on fixed assets; 
LLOARESG represents the log of loss gross loan 
reserve to total loans. In respect to macroeconomic 
variables, LGDPGR is used to denote the real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth and LINF is used to 
represent the real inflation rate. However, to 
investigate whether ownership influences bank 
profitability, this study categorises a bank as a state-
owned bank (STATE) if the government owns more 
than 50%, and foreign (FORE) if the foreign investor 
owns more than 50%. Finally, COUN and YEAR are 
used to capture country and year effects, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
 
Estimations of GMM revealed a stable coefficient as 
the Sargan test indicates no evidence of over-
identifying restrictions (see Tables 5, 6 and 7). Even 
though the equations imply that negative first-order 
autocorrelation is evident, this does not mean that 
estimates are inconsistent (Arrelano & Bond, 1991). 
However, the highly significant coefficient of lagged 
profitability measured by ROE and lagged net 
interest margin (NIM) at 10% and 1% confirms the 
dynamic character of the model specification for 
MENA commercial banks. Findings with respect to 
the market concentration (CR) suggest that increases 
in market concentration lead to an increase in MENA 
banks’ profitability in some regressions. The sign of 
the coefficient is positive and significant implying 
that the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
hypothesis (1) is accepted somehow, stressing that 
monopoly profit for banks is caused by a 
concentrated market. The fact that the impact of 
market concentration is positive in MENA economies 
is vital evidence and is at least to a certain extent 
consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014). Concentrated 
markets in MENA should raise a concern for 
regulators and policymakers about how to stimulate 
competition to force banks to develop themselves by 
introducing new banking products and services 
rather than charging their customers higher fees.  
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Table 5. Regression results using GMM (first differences) for bank profitability using Log ROA as dependent 
variable 
 
𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐴(−1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶) + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  
Variable First difference First difference First difference First difference 
LROA(-1) 
0.001 
(0.169) 
0.001 
(0.180) 
-0.053*** 
(-4.042) 
-0.054*** 
(-4.019) 
LCOST 
-1.77*** 
(-23.50) 
-1.77*** 
(-24.68) 
-1.612*** 
(-16.56) 
-1.581*** 
(-16.18) 
LEQAS 
0.586*** 
(6.189) 
0.568*** 
(6.315) 
0.633*** 
(6.827) 
0.633*** 
(7.176) 
LSECAST 
0.00 
(0.033) 
-0.005 
(-0.189) 
-0.005 
(-0.226) 
-0.016 
(-0.660) 
LSIZE 
-0.329*** 
(-5.280) 
-0.277*** 
(-9.285) 
-0.226*** 
(-6.793) 
-0.221*** 
(-6.956) 
LLOFUND 
-0.319*** 
(-4.088) 
-0.317*** 
(-4.274) 
-0.455*** 
(-4.728) 
-0.448*** 
(-4.656) 
LLOARESG 
-0.432*** 
(-9.797) 
-0.413*** 
(-10.59) 
-0.457*** 
(-7.613) 
-0.460*** 
(-8.286) 
LEXPTEC 
0.512*** 
(13.95) 
0.505**** 
(13.84) 
0.574*** 
(11.42) 
0.548*** 
(11.43) 
CR 
0.292 
(0.284) 
0.688 
(0.798) 
3.497*** 
(3.221) 
3.644*** 
(3.605) 
MS 
0.954 
(0.840) 
   
LGDPGR 
-0.007 
(-0.564) 
-0.006 
(-0.505) 
  
LINF 
-0.075 
(-1.034) 
-0.053 
(-0.858) 
-0.039 
(-0.530) 
 
FORE 
0.418** 
(2.257) 
0.495** 
(2.53) 
0.604*** 
(3.11) 
0.619*** 
(3.206) 
STATE 
0.289 
(1.573) 
0.355** 
(2.029) 
0.266 
(1.619) 
0.365** 
(2.287) 
2001 
-0.033 
(-1.200) 
-0.032 
(-1.062) 
-0.036 
(-1.135) 
-0.035 
(-1.103) 
2002 
-0.055** 
(-2.258) 
-0.063*** 
(-2.692) 
-0.077** 
(-2.537) 
-0.075 
(-2.454) 
2004 
-0.103 
(-1.648) 
-0.113** 
(-2.006) 
-0.146** 
(-2.237) 
-0.144*** 
(-2.215) 
2009 
-0.045 
(-1.531) 
-0.048 
(-1.643) 
-0.128*** 
(-3.954) 
-0.129*** 
(-3.914) 
2010 
0.066** 
(2.49) 
0.060** 
(2.27) 
0.138*** 
(5.612) 
0.137 
(5.724) 
2011 
-0.028 
(-1.086) 
-0.032 
(-1.142) 
-0.055** 
(-2.078) 
-0.056** 
(-2.18) 
2012 
0.019 
(1.160) 
0.015 
(1.071) 
0.033 
(2.376) 
0.034 
(2.428) 
Sargan test 
p-value 
67.49135 
0.460196 
68.63240 
0.455720 
73.06676 
0.315263 
73.16571 
0.312398 
*Arellano-Bond test AR(1)in first 
difference P-value 
-5.701222 
0.0000 
-4.277137 
0.0000 
-3.754727 
0.0002 
-4.021250 
0.0001 
**Arellano-Bond test AR(2)in first 
difference P-value 
-0.425490 
0.6705 
-0.610595 
0.5415 
0.412003 
0.6803 
0.448022 
0.6541 
Note: * significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
Examination of the impact of capital adequacy 
on financial performance is found to be positive and 
significant, confirming that banking regulations in 
MENA are moving forward to ensure that MENA 
banks depend on higher capital in their capital 
structure to avoid risks of default and therefore 
generate higher profitability and growth in the 
business. Such findings support the current 
discussion about capital adequacy ratios (e.g. Berger, 
1995; Demirgue-kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Pasiouras & 
Kosmidou, 2007; Kosmidou, 2008; Sufian & 
Habibullah, 2009; Sufian, 2012; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; 
Albulescu, 2015; Djalilov & Piesse, 2016), which 
argue that capital adequacy is positively associated 
with profitability under the hypothesis that well-
capitalised banks may enjoy access to cheaper and 
less risky sources of funds and better quality asset 
markets. Similarly, Elsiefy (2013) supports the 
argument that well-capitalised banks face lower 
risks of bankruptcy and therefore generate higher 
profit. The positive relationship between 
profitability and capital suggests that banks with 
superior capital tend to have more opportunities to 
diversify their business operations by strengthening 
their ability to assume risks and attract funds at low 
cost (Berger, 1995; Obamuyi, 2013). The spending on 
fixed assets is found to have a positive impact on 
the profitability of MENA banks, confirming the 
argument that capital expenditures play a role in 
increasing banks’ profits. It can be justified that 
foreign ownership and financial deregulations taking 
place over this period might have forced commercial 
banks to increase their investments in fixed assets 
and greater banking techniques. In this matter, 
Chelo and Manlagnit (2011), Chen and Liao (2011), 
and Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) suggested that 
foreign bank entry is associated with spillover 
effects on the banking sector through their 
ownership-specific advantages and possession of 
technology, and through increased competition. 
However, as predicted, weak cost efficiency 
(cost/income) in MENA banks is one of the 
determinants to lower profitability for commercial 
banks in the region, reporting a negative coefficient 
and highly significant for all regressions. Such 
findings are in line with Pasiouras and Kosmidou 
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(2007), Kosmidou (2008), Alexiou and Sofoklis 
(2009), and Trujillo-Ponce (2013). They find that bad 
cost management is one of the key contributors to 
decrease profitability for banks. It has been argued 
that the more efficient the bank, the higher the 
profitability will be, indicating that banks are 
considered to be efficient when they control costs of 
operations and administration, and in that way 
improve their financial performance (Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2014; Obamuyi, 2013; Demirguc-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 1999; and Bejaoui & Bouzarrou, 2014). In 
this respect, it is important to recognise that 
efficient cost management is crucial to enhance the 
performance of banks, particularly in regard to 
operating costs and staff expenses. This study 
argues that the main cause for such a result is that 
administrative and personnel expenses are relatively 
high in the MENA economies due to the low quality 
of regulation, corruption control and other social 
and political purposes. 
Regarding bank size (SIZE) represented by 
average total assets, findings confirmed the 
expectation that a bank’s profitability (ROA, ROE 
and NIM) is negatively and statistically affected by 
increasing the bank’s size for all regressions and 
therefore hypothesis (4) is supported. The findings 
advocate that diseconomies of scale indicate that 
large banks are likely to generate lower profits, 
which means that an increase in bank size would 
result in higher levels of marketing, operational and 
bureaucratic costs. Thus, the scale effect on 
profitability remains ambiguous (Djalilov & Piesse, 
2016). In other studies, Obamuyi (2013) and Tan and 
Floros (2012) argue that the negative association 
could be justified, as banks are becoming extremely 
large and the bureaucratic procedures would have 
negatively affected their performance. Likewise, 
Trujillo-Ponce (2013) stated that larger and more 
diversified banks tend to perform poorly, suggesting 
that smaller banks can more efficiently reduce 
asymmetric information problems related to 
lending. From this point, banking regulators and 
policymakers in MENA should pay more attention to 
merger decisions since they are more likely to be 
negative than positive.  
 
Table 6. Regression results using GMM (first differences) for bank profitability using ROE as dependent variable 
 
𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐿𝑅𝑂𝐸(−1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶) + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  
Variable First difference First difference First difference 
LROE(-1) 
0.026* 
(1.749) 
0.023* 
(1.753) 
0.025* 
(1.819) 
LCOST 
-1.873*** 
(-20.72) 
-1.789*** 
(-21.69) 
-1.709*** 
(-19.88) 
LEQAS 
-1.330*** 
(-14.348) 
-1.298*** 
(-15.078) 
-1.292*** 
(-14.55) 
LSECAST 
-0.019 
(-0.610) 
-0.057** 
(-2.249) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.733) 
LSIZE 
-0.013 
(-0.132) 
-0.250*** 
(-7.447) 
-0.245*** 
(-6.982) 
LLOFUND 
-0.319*** 
(-3.256) 
-0.404*** 
(-5.095) 
-0.400*** 
(-4.921) 
LEXPTEC 
0.176** 
(2.341) 
0.201*** 
(3.155) 
0.153*** 
(2.454) 
LLOARESG 
-0.232*** 
(-4.750) 
-0.291*** 
(-6.411) 
-0.295*** 
(-6.484) 
CR 
-3.672*** 
(-3.140) 
-4.970*** 
(-4.946) 
-4.952*** 
(-4.960) 
MS 
-3.935** 
(-2.441) 
  
LGDPGR 
0.102*** 
(5.056) 
0.120*** 
(6.595) 
0.124*** 
( 6.71) 
LINF 
0.029 
(0.270) 
-0.000 
(-0.001) 
 
FORE 
-0.133 
(-0.840) 
-0.334** 
(-2.027) 
-0.337** 
(-2.128) 
STATE 
-0.152 
(-1.337) 
-0.238 
(-2.287) 
-0.236** 
(-2.255) 
2003 
-0.109*** 
(-2.856) 
-0.139*** 
(-3.577) 
-0.137*** 
(-3.576) 
2004 
-0.092 
(-1.145) 
-0.196*** 
(-2.593) 
-0.194** 
(-2.520) 
2005 
0.094 
(0.953) 
0.233** 
(2.505) 
0.252*** 
(2.828) 
2006 
-0.205*** 
(-2.954) 
-0.162** 
(-2.446) 
-0.158 
(-2.255) 
2007 
-0.142* 
(-1.853) 
-0.050 
(-0.805) 
-0.060 
(-0.94) 
2010 
0.027 
(1.053) 
0.064*** 
(2.809) 
0.066 
(2.860) 
2011 
-0.004 
(-0.148) 
0.004 
(0.176) 
0.006 
(0.245) 
2012 
0.031* 
(1.735) 
0.059*** 
(4.447) 
0.063 
(4.469) 
Sargan test  
p-value 
64.92546 
0.616708 
68.55778 
0.526414 
68.97969 
0.512048 
*Arellano-Bond test AR(1)in first 
difference P-value 
-6.312862 
0.0000 
-4.981712 
0.0000 
-5.091441 
0.0000 
**Arellano-Bond test AR(2)in first 
difference P-value 
-1.637001 
0.1016 
-1.107742 
0.2680 
-1.182408 
0.2370 
Note: * significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
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The credit quality measured by loan loss 
reserves to gross loans ratio (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺) can be 
observed from analyses results. This variable is 
found to have a statistically significant negative and 
rather robust impact on profitability of commercial 
banks in all regression cases, supporting hypothesis 
(6) and the findings of other studies (Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2014; Ahmad et al., 2012; Bejaoui & 
Bouzgarrou, 2014; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; and Alper & 
Anbar, 2011). Actually, the control of credit quality 
is still an arguable matter especially in the case of 
developing economies like MENA. This paper 
suggests that commercial banks operating in MENA 
need to show their capabilities to control loss on 
loans by employing effective recovery and advancing 
of loans policy because less loss on loans portfolios 
leads to maintaining higher profitability for banks 
and stability of the whole financial system. Trujillo-
Ponce (2013), who examined Spanish banks, 
suggests that this variable is a central factor as 
profitability decreases significantly and such an 
occurrence could exist because an increase in the 
doubtful assets, which do not increase income, 
entails a bank to allocate a major percentage of its 
gross margin to provision to cover expected credit 
losses; hence, profitability will decrease.  
Turning to bank ownership, foreign ownership is 
found to support the argument that banks with 
foreign ownership are more profitable than domestic 
banks in MENA economies when ROA is run as a 
dependent variable, to find some support for 
hypothesis (7), which is in line with previous studies 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1999; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 
2014; and Farazi et al., 2011). Banks with foreign 
ownership in MENA are more likely to overcome any 
informational disadvantages relative to domestic 
banks through superior banking technology and level 
of development. For macroeconomic variables, the 
inflation is found to be positively and significantly 
related to net interest margin. This fact is explained 
by the theory that banks in inflation periods are more 
profitable, and that management for those banks 
seems to anticipate future inflation, and therefore 
interest rates have been properly adjusted. The effect 
of GDPGR on bank profitability using ROE is 
statistically significant and positive, which implies 
that bank profits in MENA are generated in the 
growing economic period. Turning to the year effect, 
it can be observed that 2002 in some regressions has 
a negative and significant relationship with the 
profitability of banks due to the collapse in economic 
activity that arose in developed economies. The 
economy in the European Union for the period 2000-
2001 and the United States in 2002 and 2003 is 
influenced by that recession and thereby affected 
MENA economies. The years of the Global Financial 
Crisis, 2007, 2008 and 2009, are negative and 
statistically significant in some cases with 
profitability in terms of ROA. Two years, 2011 and 
2012, are negatively related and significant to ROA in 
all cases as countries such Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, 
Yemen, Syria and Bahrain experienced deterioration in 
their financial and economic systems due to political 
conflict.  
 
Table 7. Regression results using GMM (first differences) for bank performance using NIM as dependent variable 
 
𝐿𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐿𝑁𝐼𝑀(−1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑄𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑇𝐸𝐶) + 𝛼1𝐶𝑅𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑗𝑡 +
𝛾2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸 + 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅  
Variable First difference First difference First difference First difference 
LNIM(-1) 
0.137*** 
(8.289) 
0.138*** 
(8.080) 
0.143*** 
(8.702) 
0.144*** 
(8.789) 
LCOST 
-0.199*** 
(-3.099) 
-0.165*** 
(-2.638) 
-0.235*** 
(-4.398) 
-0.226*** 
(-4.503) 
LEQAS 
0.346*** 
(8.273) 
0.349*** 
(8.858) 
0.344*** 
(11.58) 
0.344*** 
(11.61) 
LSECAST 
0.048*** 
(4.305) 
0.047*** 
(4.168) 
0.048*** 
(4.065) 
0.047*** 
(4.051) 
LSIZE 
-0.131*** 
(-3.280) 
-0.133*** 
(-3.235) 
-0.081** 
(-1.95) 
-0.102*** 
(-3.01) 
LLOFUND 
0.055 
(1.031) 
0.056 
(1.134) 
  
LEXPTEC 
0.042 
(1.117) 
   
LLOARESG 
-0.147*** 
(-5.543) 
-0.139*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.138*** 
(-5.466) 
-0.143*** 
(-6.230) 
CR 
-0.816 
(-1.166) 
-0.354 
(-0.521) 
-0.469 
(-0.672) 
 
MS 
-0.048 
(-0.066) 
0.090 
(0.125) 
-0.071 
(-0.104) 
 
LGDPGR 
-0.199*** 
(-9.37) 
-0.188*** 
(-9.163) 
-0.171*** 
(-8.776) 
-0.175*** 
(-9.057) 
LINF 
0.451*** 
(3.967) 
0.484*** 
(4.391) 
0.481*** 
(4.562) 
0.473*** 
(4.630) 
FORE 
0.020 
(0.203) 
0.039 
(0.394) 
-0.055 
(-0.560) 
-0.002 
(-0.021) 
STATE 
-0.491*** 
(-3.431) 
-0.467*** 
(-3.156) 
-0.546*** 
(-3.742) 
-0.492*** 
(-4.368) 
2001 
-0.149*** 
(-4.886) 
-0.135*** 
(-4.861) 
-0.132*** 
(-4.961) 
-0.132*** 
(-5.025) 
2009 
-0.143*** 
(-7.51) 
-0.145*** 
(-8.087) 
-0.141*** 
(-8.835) 
-0.136*** 
(-8.207) 
2010 
-0.008 
(-0.581) 
-0.008 
(-0.641) 
-0.002 
(-0.219) 
-0.001 
(-0.118) 
2011 
-0.058*** 
(-3.739) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.831) 
-0.047*** 
(-3.276) 
-0.049 
(-3.332) 
Sargan test p-value 
68.00924 
0.442627 
67.55486 
0.492427 
68.30357 
0.466855 
68.18565 
0.539106 
*Arellano-Bond test AR(1)in 
first difference P-value 
-4.756441 
0.0000 
-4.662228 
0.0000 
-4.287358 
0.0000 
-4.216813 
0.0000 
**Arellano-Bond test AR(2)in 
first difference P-value 
1.310499 
0.1900 
1.370154 
0.1706 
1.058820 
0.2897 
1.340797 
0.1800 
Note:  * significant at the 10% level 
 ** significant at the 5% level 
 *** significant at 1% level 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this paper has been to investigate 
determinants of MENA banks profitability in the 
context of SCP hypothesis. It examined whether 
banks that operate in concentrated markets are able 
to make monopoly profits. It found in some cases 
that a bank’s performance can be better explained 
by the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
hypothesis that claims that a highly concentrated 
market leads to collusive behaviour among banks, 
resulting in superior performance. Also, in the 
context of this model, this study investigated the 
impact of bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic factors on the profitability of MENA 
banks, so that findings can be used by regulators, 
policymakers and other stakeholders to optimise 
managerial, human and capital resources, and to 
enhance viability of and confidence in the financial 
system.  
The policy implications that can be beneficial 
either for regulators, bank management, 
shareholders and other stakeholders are as follows: 
the empirical analysis that investigated the impact 
of market structure on profitability showed collusive 
power in some cases of the banking industry which 
asserts that increased market power yields 
monopoly profits supporting the SCP hypothesis. 
Therefore, the high profits were the consequence of 
higher market concentration and collusion; the 
providing of financial services would hinder the 
potential development of the MENA economy. It 
indicates that higher profits influence the regulatory 
decision in terms of mergers which can be used by 
regulators and policymakers to reassess the market 
structure and performance to decide whether they 
should intervene to change market structure to 
stimulate competition and improve quality of 
banking services and to deter insolvency.  
In respect to capital adequacy, findings show 
that well-capitalised banks (Equity to Assets) are 
more profitable implying that regulators should 
ensure that MENA banks are better capitalised in 
order to generate profit and grow in the sector, 
withstand potential financial crises and avoid 
insolvency. A significant finding is also that 
government policies in MENA should encourage 
commercial banks to raise their capital to safeguard 
the stability of the financial system in case of 
systemic liquidity risks, as well as enabling 
commercial banks to advance more loans to a 
market and thus to provide an environment which 
will accelerate economic growth.  
However, bank size in terms of total assets in 
MENA economies contributed in reducing 
profitability, suggesting that larger banks were less 
profitable than small banks (diseconomies of scale). 
Such a fact is considered to be important to 
regulators, policymakers, bank managers, and 
prospective investors in the MENA economies as to 
highlight that growth in total assets by acquisition 
or mergers may not be appropriate and effective in 
this region. The negative impact of size on 
profitability could be attributed to increased 
bureaucratic procedures and other factors attributed 
to an increase in the number of employees, 
departmental expenditures and appointing of 
unskilled staff. Regarding the quality of asset 
allocation, such processes must be enhanced as 
credit risk is negatively related to profitability. Thus, 
government and regulators in MENA should promote 
the development of capital markets to ensure the 
transparency of banks, and provide for better 
monitoring of bank activities. This involves training 
in credit assessment and risk allocation. 
In spite of deregulation of banking systems, 
commercial banks in MENA still have higher costs 
which result in lower profits. In order for MENA 
banks to be competitive and more efficient, they 
should go further in reducing their administrative 
costs, particularly those of the state banks which 
tend to be overstaffed. It was also found that some 
macroeconomic factors, namely GDP growth and 
inflation, affect profits. GDP growth (GRGDP) had a 
significant and positive effect on ROA, but also a 
negative and significant impact on net interest 
margin. The inflation (inf) was found to have a 
higher and positive relationship with net interest 
margin. A possible justification is that in the 
inflation period, banking industry costs lead to more 
transactions and commonly to more extensive 
branch networks, and finally to higher profit 
revenues showing that during inflation periods 
banks effectively shift their costs to customers and 
increase their profits.  
Finally, the study found that banks with foreign 
ownership are more profitable and perform better 
than state banks. This result can be explained by 
foreign banks’ technological advantages which can 
be strong enough to overcome any informational 
disadvantages in lending or by raising funds locally. 
It could also be argued that foreign banks tend to 
make lower profits than domestic banks in well-
developed economies because entering into the 
market of industrial and well-developed economies 
is more difficult due to high costs and strong 
regulations. In addition, foreign banks’ technological 
and efficiency advantages in developed economies 
can be insignificant, while facing higher 
informational and reputational disadvantages. 
Limitations of this study are associated with 
the nature of data, as it used secondary data, 
primarily collected from banks’ financial statements; 
therefore, this kind of data may be subjected to 
measurement and allocation errors which are 
common to traditional accounting reports. 
Furthermore, some financial data were not provided 
by commercial banks in MENA such as non-
performing loans and number of ATMs. In addition, 
this study covers only a limited period, 1999-2012, 
as financial data before this period are unavailable. 
However, this study only covered these issues for 
conventional banks operating in MENA economies. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that future studies 
go further to investigate Islamic banks in MENA and 
to identify whether there are differences in 
productivity, profitability, and revenues when 
compared to conventional banks. In addition, the 
period of study can be extended, and future studies 
can also include a number of other variables which 
have not yet been investigated. Finally, this study 
can be further expanded to incorporate a 
comparison with other emerging markets in order to 
see whether or not there are important similarities 
or differences which could prove useful for the 
banking industry.  
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